Emeritus professor Itamar Rabinovich, former Israeli ambassador to Washington and the person who headed the 1992 team negotiating peace with Syria, observed the quickfire collapse of the Assad regime in awe, but even this foundational event doesn’t make him believe that peace is at hand
By: Sherry Makover Belikov, Maariv, December 28 2024
In the summer of ’92, after the second Labor (Avoda) government was formed, then Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin appointed Prof. Itamar Rabinovich as head of the negotiation team for the peace talks with Syria. Rabinovich, an international expert on the history of the Middle East, attacked the role with gusto. “I had been researching Syria for years,” he says, “and the idea that it might be possible to get Syria and Israel to cooperate appealed to me.”
Did you really think there was a chance for a peace agreement with Syria?
“It almost happened. The hope was to reach a peace accord with the four partners: the Syrians, the Jordanians, the Palestinians and the Lebanese. It was clear that you can’t make peace with everyone all at once, and you have to start in one place, so Yitzhak Rabin and also the Americans opted to start with either the Syrians or the Palestinians. At the time, neither Jordan nor Lebanon were good candidates for that first step, while Syria seemed like a simpler conflict to resolve than the national conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.”
Despite the dictator Hafez al-Assad?
“Assad was considered a tough negotiator, but a leader who keeps his agreements. He was meticulous about honoring the force separation agreement we signed with him in ’74. So we thought if we could draw Syria away from Iran, we would have the key to geopolitical change in the region.”
And what happened in practice?
“It was a difficult negotiation that lasted several months, and then we got stuck. The Syrians told us, on Assad’s behalf, that he’s ready to make peace, but isn’t willing to elaborate what he means by ‘peace’ before we commit to a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Our answer was that you don’t start negotiations from the bottom line. You get to the bottom line at the end and even if we don’t say that we won’t withdraw from the Golan, let’s see what happens first and what we get in exchange.”
Since the Syrian path failed, Rabin turned to the Palestinians and the Oslo Accords. “We were almost ready to sign and still Rabin wanted to give one last chance to the Syrian option. In order to break the deadlock, he gave US Secretary of State Warren Christopher what’s called a “deposit”, which means a hypothetical, conditional willingness to withdraw from the Golan Heights in return for a sufficient peace agreement and sufficient security measures with Syria.”
You were present. How did it happen?
“Usually, a meeting between a prime minister and a president or secretary of state at this level begins with a small meeting where the two main figures are present as well as two recorders. This time it was Prime Minister Rabin, Secretary of State Christopher, Dennis Ross as the American recorder and me as the Israeli one. In the adjacent room were another five or six Israelis like Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak, and a similar number of very senior Americans. Usually, the short private meeting only lasts a few minutes, but this one was about half an hour, and then Rabin dropped a bombshell: he told the Secretary ‘tomorrow, when you go to Damascus, ask Hafez al-Assad if, given he gets what he wants, he’ll give me what I want.’
It’s what’s called in Diplomacy the “hypothetical approach”, when both sides deposit their positions with a reliable mediator and the mediator uses them to move negotiations forward. I remember when we left the room after Rabin gave Christopher the deposit, and we were walking towards the government meeting room, I told Dennis Ross, although I’m not a fan of dramatic statements, ‘we’ve just heard the wings of history beating, because Rabin gave Christopher the keys to peace with Syria.’ It was a unique moment.”
What were Rabin’s terms for peace?
“Rabin described a peace arrangement with corrections and terms, required that the withdrawal would take place over five years, and in the first stage no settlement would be removed and Syria would demonstrate normalization in order to convince the Israeli public that Syria was no longer an enemy country. He also demanded massive security arrangements to compensate Israel for the loss of the Heights. And in all this time, Rabin kept repeating to Christopher: ‘put my hypothetical offer in your pocket, don’t put it on the table.’ He reiterated this over and over, and then Christopher went to Damascus and returned after two days.”
And what did he bring back?
“He told us, I have good news Assad agrees in principle, but for every point that Rabin raised he has objections. Withdrawal over six months, not five years. Mutual security arrangements because Syria is a victim and Israel is the aggressor. He also didn’t like the word “normalization” because in the Syrian language it’s associated with horse training and is offensive. And so it became a market, and it was clear to all of us that Christopher had not left Rabin’s hypothetical offer in his pocket but placed it on the table right off the bat, which was a colossal mistake.”
Why did the American Secretary of State make this mistake? He was experienced enough when he brought the separation agreement in ’94.
“Because he was in a rush. When he was working on the separation agreement, it took him a whole month in which he went back and forth between Jerusalem and Damascus until he reached an agreement. This time he tried to take a shortcut and he pared the Israeli position. It was clear that Rabin no longer trusted him as a mediator, and indeed he abandoned the Syrian path and gave the green light to complete the Oslo accords.”
How did the Syrians react when the first agreement ended up being with the Palestinians?
“They were angry, especially when the next agreement after that was signed with Jordan. When the Palestinians signed the Oslo accords, it paved the way for King Hussein, and a year later the peace accord with Jordan was signed. The Syrians wanted the role of the big brother - they wanted to get on the bus first and hold out their hand to the younger siblings to get on board after them. In reality, as I said at the time, two others got on board and the Syrians were left on the curb..”
Rabinovich, who served as the sixth president of Tel Aviv University, is an emeritus professor of Middle Eastern History and the former Israeli Ambassador to the United States. But above all, he is considered one of the leading scholars of Syrian politics. His book “Syria under the Ba’th: 1963-1966” was based on his PhD research and reviewed the rise of the Syrian Ba’th party during the revolution in the divided country. This interview takes place mere days after the end of the party’s murderous rule with the fall of (Bashar) Assad’s regime in almost insulting speed – marking one of the biggest geopolitical events the Middle East has known in the past decade.
The fact that the handful of opportunities to promote peace with the Syrians during Rabinovich’s watch even occurred, seems, in retrospect, nothing short of amazing. “The first time was when Rabin sent the deposit with the messenger, who revealed his cards to soon, and the second was toward Hafez al-Assad’s death,” explains Rabinovich. “The Syrian president wanted to renew negotiations during his meeting with Madeleine Albright. Ehud Barak was prime minister then. Perhaps he viewed Barak as a potential partner, or maybe he wanted to complete the negotiations and leave his son and successor Bashar a clear desk. In practice it failed because he no longer had the physical nor the political strength left.
How did you feel when these attempts failed?
“Through my long years studying diplomatic history, I learned that the negotiator should never fall in love with his own negotiation. The goal was to try to strike a good agreement. If we can get one, good. If not, then not at all costs. Sometimes you need give up.”
Some background: the Alawite religion in Syria, which separated itself from Shiite Islam and became a strange amalgamation of Islamic, pagan and Christian elements, existed in the Alawite mountains and was considered weak and exploited. That’s where both father Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar grew up.
“The turning point was when the French began promoting minorities such as the Alawites, the Druze and the Kurds against the Sunni majority, which they saw as supporting Arab nationalism that was hostile to France,” says Rabinovich. “When a local military was established, the Alawites were prominent in it. For a person who grew up on the mountain, a military career was a good way to climb the social ladder.”
With Syria’s independence in ’45, the Syrian army had Alawite officers and NCOs, including pilot Hafez al-Assad, who would eventually become Syria’s president. When the Alawites formed the Ba’th party, which represented a secular Arab nationalism, they were attractive to minority groups that hoped to escape the margins and become part of the great Arab nation. But when the Ba’th took power in the military coup of ’63, it was only a matter of time until the Alawites got rid of all other minorities and Assad the elder formed a hereditary dictatorship and brutally quashed any attempt at resistance. “And at the same time, Hafez al-Assad also built up the Syrian state and turned it from weak and unimportant to a regional power,” says Rabinovich. “In essence, Assad offered the Syrian people a deal: you’ll accept my corrupt dictatorial regime, and in return you’ll get order and national pride.”
His son Bashar was the heir?
“Bashar wasn’t the heir apparent, but rather his brother, who died in a car crash. Basher actually studied ophthalmology in London and was completing his residency when he was called home and dressed in a major’s uniform. His father trained him for six years, until he rose to power and became a mediocre ruler. When the civil war broke out, he made a mistake and went against the rebels with brutality. A series of countries, like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco, understood that they had to compromise with protestors and rebels in their territories. They acknowledged unrest, made gestures towards the rebels and spared themselves civil uprisings. Turkish leader Erdogan told Assad again and again: compromise with the rebels, make some gestures, don’t go against them – and Assad didn’t listen to him. So Erdogan turned against him and joined the rebels. In 2015 they were close to victory, but then the Russians joined from the air and together with Iran, who gave ground support through Hezbollah, they saved Assad and his rule.”
In the last week, the rebels released thousands of prisoners that Assad had incarcerated. Are they a living testimony of the brutal story of oppression?
“Yes. During the civil war more than half a million civilians were killed, at least 1,500 by chemical weapons. The prisoners released this week and the conditions in which they were kept tell the whole story. Assad was a brutal dictator, there is no doubt about it.”
What happened in this uprising? How were the rebels so successful in such a short time?
“There are a number of historical examples of an Islamist force that starts a war and conquers massive areas of land in a short time. The first time was after Muhammad’s death, when the Muslims conquered large parts of the inhabited world of the period, met the Byzantine empire that was already in decline, and got to Europe and North Africa in astonishing speed despite being on camelback. The second time was in the 18th century, when the Saudis conquered the peninsula with astonishing speed. And this time, the Islamists broke out of Idlib, with Turkish aid and support.”
Why was Assad able to win the war in 2015, but failed this time?
“Because this time, the three factors – Iran, Russia and Hezbollah – that had saved him from defeat the previous time, were busy with other problems, such as Ukraine and the Israeli front, and so there was a moment of opportunity. In addition, all three had been disappointed by Assad and decided he was a liability and wasn’t worth investing in. It was quick and easy, because Assad’s regime was rotten to the core, as it turns out. Assad didn’t win the civil war. He just survived it. Syria was functioning again, but the military and security services were divided between Iranian-influenced units and Russian-influenced units. Corruption was off the charts. Assad’s brother Maher was manufacturing illicit drugs and distributing them throughout Jordan to the Gulf, and the entire regime was run like the Assad family’s private estate. There was no rehabilitation, no efforts to return the refugees or reach a political resolution – which is why Assad didn’t get any assistance from the West. At the moment of truth. everything collapsed like a house of cards.”
Is it possible that when a dictatorship collapses, an army built on survival rather than loyalty deserts and moves on to the next ruler?
“Yes and no. For many years, especially during Hafez’s regime, a system was put in place to control the Syrian military and security apparatus, which involved the appointment of Alawites. Every officer had an Alawite above him and below him. These people might not have liked the regime, but they were afraid to go against it, although recently the military was also weakened by the desertion of Sunni soldiers who didn’t want to fight Sunni rebels. I think that every dictator observing the events currently unfolding in Syria is asking themselves what this could mean for them.. Some learn and adapt. Others say it won’t happen to me, as Basher Assad said in an interview in 2011, when he was asked about events in Egypt. Assad said ‘it won’t happen to me because I represent the resistance and so I have legitimacy.’ Every dictator and his own path.”
Despite the economic rot, the corruption in the Assad family, and the ongoing weakness since the civil war, Prof. Rabinovich was as surprised as the rest of the world by the success of the insurgency and the speed with which everything collapsed. “I was also surprised both by the speed of the uprising and the passivity of the three external supporters,” he says.
“In Iran. there’s also substantial resistance to the regime, and there were protests and riots that were brutally crushed. There wasn’t an insurgency of this kind. On the other hand, in Iraq, if there hadn’t been an organized opposition, Saddam Hussein would have continued to rule as a dictator. The ISIS fighters at the time were very good fighters. Just in the previous decade ISIS conquered large parts of Syria and Iraq in a whirlwind, and even threatened Baghdad and Jordan. When a determined force decides to push forward, sometimes it succeeds and sometimes it doesn’t.
It's hard not to think of October the 7th, when a determined Islamist force surged forth quickly in Toyotas and conquered dozens of settlements and military posts within hours.
“Unfortunately, on October 7th, we were the ones in the house of cards. We can’t say we weren’t prewarned, because we were. HadIf a force of tanks and some helicopters been sent in, if there had been preparedness at dawn, things would have been different. But very sadly, the Golani soldiers were caught off guard, asleep in their beds, and that’s when the disaster happened. Luckily, we recovered quickly and after a day and a half we were functioning, but for that day and a half we weren’t and the results were terrible.”
What do we know about the rebels? On the one hand we can’t ignore their record as mass murderers, and on the other hand the revolution appears to be bloodless.
“It’s smart. Abu Mohammad al-Julani and his people managed Idlib pretty well. The Turks became a very important player in Syria and they didn’t let the Russians go into Idlib. They were worried about another wave of refugees, and probably hinted that it was now time to push forward. They got cooperation from the former prime minister, and managed an organized transfer of power. Now there are remnants of the Syrian opposition that are in Europe, and I thought maybe al-Julani would turn to them and invite them to form at least the appearance of a necessary political government, with him acting behind the scenes like Hezbollah in Lebanon, but he chose the limelight and decided that the new government would be formed by his people who came with him from Idlib.
And still, even the method of taking over the governing bodies in Syria, and the attempt to create continuity and order and allow the opposition to join them and the fighters to lay down their arms without risk of death – speak for themselves. So far there hasn’t been any attack of the Alawite minority, but on the other hand, there are questions about al-Julani’s intentions. In the world people still wonder about the nature and intentions of the new regime, and the US has sent three diplomats to assess the situation and open communications with the regime. We need to wait and see what the implications will be of the Turkish connection and the hit sustained by the Syrian Kurds, who currently rule over about one third of the country’s area and enjoy some American support.”
Is there a chance that the Syrian opposition will form a government instead of, or together with the rebels?
“It’s hard to tell. Right now a Jihadist Islamist group has taken power, and while it is trying to shake this image, we can’t tell where things will go. A lot of interested parties are actively influencing what happens in Syria politically. The big question is whether the new government will manage to take control of most of Syria, and also the open question of what will happen to the residents of the Alawite mountain region.”
Are the Alawites even waiting for the answer or are they fleeing Syria?
“I assume part of the leadership, those who didn’t have a jet like Bashar, escaped to Iran or will stay in Iraq. I have no doubt that the extended Assad family and the high leadership have had the sense to escape.”
What will be the nature of the new regime in Damascus? Could Syria return to the dark days of ISIS and the Taliban?
“I don’t think al-Julani is aiming for that. He has been moving away from an extremist image, presenting himself as an Islamist rather than a Jihadist, because Jihad is a violent method that tries to push Islam by force, and the rebels have emphasized that they want Islam without violence. On the other hand, we can’t forget that Syria is a very divided country that was created because of French imperial concerns. The solution to a stable state in this case is to create a pluralistic political system that divides the government between the groups and gives each one representation. That’s never been the case in Syria, and I struggle to see how a Jihadist group would achieve that, so I’m worried that Syria is entering a period of instability or a dictatorship that will oppress any resistance to the regime.”
Where is Israel in all of this? Representatives of the Kurds have applied to Israel for aid and protection, after the Syrian rebels supported by Turkey began attacking them in the north of Syria.
“I’m not sure we want to get into this issue. Sticking our fingers in the Kurdish issue means creating a deep conflict with Turkey. I’m not sure that’s our top priority right now.”
What is the role of Syrian citizens in the efforts to achieve peace with Israel? Because even today, in the wake of the fall of the regime, there are civilian voices calling for normalization with Israel.
“When we talk about dictatorial regimes, there is a gap between the positions of the ruling elite and the general public. Sometimes, because of the public’s hostility towards the elite, it holds opposing positions. In Iran, for example, our most bitter enemy today, the leadership’s position doesn’t necessarily represent that of 80% of the Iranian people. And Syria is the same way. There are quite a few Syrian citizens who, despite years of fighting, aren’t hostile towards Israel. During the civil war I met a lot of leaders and activists of the Syrian opposition in Europe who said that when they defeat Assad and form their own government – which doesn’t seem very certain at all right now – they’ll want to make peace with Israel in return for the Golan.”
Do the people even have a say?
“No, and that’s the problem. I don’t expect mass protests in Syria right now. There are a lot of people involved in Syrian politics, Turkey at the top – which is al-Julani’s patron of sorts, and is focused on the Kurdish issue and the capital of the Kurdish region, which is an area rich in oil and agricultural potential. It could be that the Turks will destroy the Kurdish autonomy. Erdogan isn’t shy in these areas.”
Do you think Israel will get involved?
“I wouldn’t suggest that Israel get involved in Syria. When we tried in ’82 to get involved and influence politics in Lebanon, we saw how this bitter attempt ended. There are countries that will get involved, and the Russians and Iranians haven’t totally given up their Syrian ambitions. The Russians want to keep their three bases in Syria and they’ll aim to reach an agreement with the new regime that will allow them to keep them. The Iranians, who bet on a huge investment in Syria, will also try to salvage what they can. They’ve already changed their tone and stopped calling the rebels ‘terrorists’. Those who try to prevent Iran from strengthening their position in Syria again will be Israel on the one hand, and moderate Sunni countries like Jordan, the Saudis and the Emirates on the other.”
In the meantime. Israel doesn’t seem to be sitting on the fence. It’s destroying military infrastructure in Syria, airports, air force assets.
“I really hope the decision makers in Israel have thought through what it means, what we’re doing there. We’ve gone well beyond the mission of securing the border region. I think it was unnecessary, just like the miserable decision to raise the Israeli flag on the Syrian Hermon. Why stick a finger in their eye? Israel should worry about its own interests and attempt to hinder Iranian attempts to reestablish their Syrian positions.”
What are the Americans saying?
“Trump has already written on social media that Syria is not his business and they shouldn’t get dragged into it. The problem with this attitude is that there is an opportunity to reshape the geopolitical reality in the Middle East, something we’ve started, but the Americans have to take the lead on this move. There’s an international element here with the anti-American axis of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.
Biden rightly said that this axis has to be countered by an American-Saudi defence alliance, to normalize Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia and build a coalition that has already been partially in play in the two Iranian missile attacks. But Trump, even in his first term, wanted to withdraw the 3,000 American troops in Syria and he was convinced not to do it. As a second term president, based on his social media statements, he may pull the troops from Syria and leave the Kurds to fend for themselves. There is a thing called ‘credible commitment’ of powers to the people who help them, but Trump isn’t a big believer in that.”
What’s the difference between him and Biden?
“The differences are massive. Biden is a traditional American politician, who spent decades in the Senate. He is a centrist Democrat, a man who arrived at the presidency too late with an admirable set of values and skills. Trump, on the other hand, is an extremist populist, an opportunist, lacking in education and values. I don’t think the United States faces an existential threat, but with him at the helm, it is in serious trouble. It is already apparent in Trump’s political appointments and what he’s saying and writing. It’s scary. He’s trying to destroy the federal government, if he’s putting at the head of the FBI someone who is considered an enemy of that organization, and appointing a politician from Hawaii who is known for her support of Putin and Assad as the head of the Intelligence community.”
You were Israel’s ambassador to the US in ’93. How do you explain the antisemitism that erupted on campuses and in many areas following the October 7 massacre and the war?
“The Americans didn’t want to see what needed to be seen. There is a very effective BDS movement that has been working in the US for many years set the groundwork specifically for this moment. It didn’t happen in a day. The campus protests didn’t happen at once. People who weren’t students were involved, and the presidents who were forced to resign weren’t bad people, they were just caught by surprise and didn’t know how to handle a difficult situation. It is possible that the golden age of American Jewry’s growth and influence in culture and economics is over.”
Which is bad news for us.
“Yes, it’s bad news for Israel.”
The German thinker Karl Marx wrote that history doesn’t repeat itself except as tragedy or farce. Journalist Patrick Seale applied this to Syria, describing how behind each of the big military coups that occurred in it stood an external force. “The powers fighting for influence in the Middle East have made Syria into a player,” says Rabinovich. “I think we are in a similar moment but not because history is repeating itself, but because everyone is fighting to remodel Syria in a way that serves their interests.”
Do you think there's a chance that history will repeat itself in that an effort will be made again to jumpstart peace talks? “The question is does Israel even want that. No one, especially not al-Julani, whose very name means ‘the Golan’, will make peace with Israel without demanding the Golan Heights in return. Does the Israeli government want to make a peace like that? Just this week Netanyahu spoke against leaving the Golan. He just forgot that he gave Ron Lauder, who represented him in negotiations with Assad in ’98, a green light to leave the Golan for peace.”
If the prime minister doesn’t have the desire, the mandate or the base to relinquish the Golan, what will be the nature of our relationship with Syria?
“In the best-case scenario, it will be a non-hostile relationship, like we had for a long time with the Assad regime. It's highly unlikely that a mediator will be able to engage in indirect or secret negotiations between Israel and al-Julani to the point of reaching an agreement to just reasonably coexist side by side, without even trying to negotiate peace.”
So everything will be just as it was?
“No. First, the Iranian influence has been almost eradicated. After all, the Iranians tried to build a missile arsenal in Syria like the one they established in Lebanon with Hezbollah - an arsenal they would directly control. Before the revolution, we were unable to destroy this arsenal, but now, it will likely be fully destroyed.. It could be that Iran will lose all influence in Syria, and so the Iranian axis, which planned to attack Israel from several proxies, has suffered a serious blow. In that sense the fall of Assad’s regime is a net gain for Israel.”
As an expert on the Middle East, what do you think Israel should do in Gaza and Lebanon?
“We have to end whatever remains of the war in Gaza. Normalize life there. In Lebanon the military round is over, and this seems more stable now because Hezbollah also took a major hit in Syria. But we need to remember that that we still have a problem, because Lebanon is not functioning as a state. Hezbollah is still stronger than the Lebanese government. In Gaza we also haven’t solved the problem because we didn’t help create an alternative to Hamas, so even if we announce the war is over, the problem isn’t over. The idea of bringing the Palestinian Authority to Gaza is unacceptable to the Israeli government, and I don’t see any other body that could manage the Strip and would be willing to fight Hamas other than the Palestinian Authority, which will also need help from Western and European powers. But the Israeli government isn’t interested in this option.”
Many people claim that the deliberate delay in creating an alternative rule in Gaza, which prevents ending the war in the South, serves the Messianic views of the government and the Prime Minister’s political survival.
“It’s true. Israel has a problem. We have the most right wing government, which includes messianic elements that I believe are a threat to national security. Just as the Syrians need to solve their own problems as a country, Israel also has to do this, being a divided society around the major issues of its existence. In addition to the serious external problems Israel faces, it will continue to struggle with a deep internal crisis.”
Does it threaten our existence?
“It threatens our security and, to some extent I think also our existence. If a country with a political system is unable to secure a consensus about the existential problems of its existence, it can’t function. For us there is the Palestinian issue, an Arab minority in the country itself that we need to find a respectful and effective way to coexist with, there’s the problem of secular-religious relations on two levels: the ultra-orthodox and the national-religious movement. The ultra-orthodox don’t want to serve in the military, but want to enjoy the country’s resources. The national-religious in part support messianic ideas, and the threat on the judiciary is part of an attack by the prime minister and the extreme right on the legal system and the system of regulation, the rule of law and the gatekeepers.”
And the hostages?
“The heart breaks. A full deal should have been made a long time ago, and since it hasn’t– it must be done at once. Apart from the pain and suffering of the hostages and their families, there is a fundamental core value at the heart of this issue, and if we deny it, I think we won’t be able to live with ourselves in years to come. It will be a stain.”
Two years and two months in captivity. It’s already a stain.
“There’s no reason to make it darker and deeper.”
What can we do to fix this?
“I think the answer lies in one word: leadership. When there are societies that are divided and in crisis, the way to resolve the crisis and successfully make your way out of it is to appoint a leader who can unite, who can find solutions and lead the people in the right direction. I was very impressed with the protest movement that stopped the first round of the judicial coup. Hundreds of thousands of people protested quietly, in a restrained manner. When I went to Kaplan, I noticed that there were almost no papers thrown on the floor. It was an impressive movement. There are a lot of wonderful things in this country that haven’t disappeared. They are being overshadowed right now, but they aren’t going anywhere. Leadership has to nurture these things and make them influential and central.”
Comments